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The Kennedy Doctrine:  
Moral Disagreement and the 
“Bare Desire to Harm” 
Maggie Gallagher† & William C. Duncan†† 
Is there a distinctive Kennedy Doctrine in Fourteenth Amendment 
jurisprudence? 
 We believe so. 
True, it is not clear who else on the Supreme Court adheres to the 
Kennedy Doctrine aside from Justice Anthony Kennedy himself: In the 
substantive analysis of United States v. Windsor,1 Justice Kennedy 
cited six Supreme Court precedents, three of which he authored,2 and 
one decision out of the First Circuit Court of Appeals.3 
The Kennedy Doctrine, as it has emerged in a series of opinions 
drafted by Justice Anthony Kennedy culminating in the Windsor 
decision striking down the Defense of Marriage Act4 (“DOMA”), 
represents a startling conceptual departure not only from constitutional 
theories of limited government and textual originalism, but from 
standard equal protection jurisprudence as well. 
In Windsor, Justice Kennedy abandoned the established standard 
equal protection doctrine, which defines a small set of protected classes 
for special scrutiny. He declined in other words to decide that sexual 
orientation is now a protected class requiring strict scrutiny, and then 
apply standard equal protection doctrines to his legal analysis. Under 
standard equal protection analysis, the classes that may receive (in this 
sense) unequal or “heightened” Constitutional protection are cabined 
by requiring the class shows a combination of (1) a history of legal 
marginalization for (2) the unchosen and largely unchangeable nature 
of the category of people affected. 
 
† Maggie Gallagher is a senior fellow with the American Principles Project, 
and was formerly the president of the National Organization for Marriage. 
†† William Duncan is the Director of the Marriage Law Foundation, and was 
formerly a visiting professor at J. Reuben Clark Law School, Brigham 
Young University. 
1. 133 S. Ct. 2675 (2013). 
2. The three non-Kennedy opinions are: Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena, 
515 U.S. 200 (1995); U.S. Dep’t of Agric. v. Moreno, 413 U.S. 528 (1973); 
and Bolling v. Sharpe, 347 U.S. 497 (1954). The opinions by Justice 
Kennedy are: Bond v. United States, 133 S. Ct. 2355 (2011); Lawrence v. 
Texas, 539 U.S. 558 (2003); and Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620 (1996). 
3. See Massachusetts v. U.S. Dep’t of Health & Human Servs., 682 F.3d 1 
(1st Cir. 2012), cert. denied, 133 S. Ct. 2884, 2887 (2013).  
4. 1 U.S.C. § 7 (2012), invalidated by Windsor, 133 S. Ct. 2675.  
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Instead of using this framework, Justice Kennedy set sail into the 
uncharted territory of a new doctrine suggesting that “unusual” new 
legislative acts must be scrutinized for their effects on the human 
dignity of minorities. As Justice Kennedy wrote in Windsor: 
In determining whether a law is motived by an improper animus 
or purpose, “[d]iscriminations of an unusual character” especially 
require careful consideration. DOMA cannot survive under these 
principles. The responsibility of the States for the regulation of 
domestic relations is an important indicator of the substantial 
societal impact the State’s classifications have in the daily lives 
and customs of its people. DOMA’s unusual deviation from the 
usual tradition of recognizing and accepting state definitions of 
marriage here operates to deprive same-sex couples of the benefits 
and responsibilities that come with the federal recognition of their 
marriages. This is strong evidence of a law having the purpose 
and effect of disapproval of that class. The avowed purpose and 
practical effect of the law here in question are to impose a 
disadvantage, a separate status, and so a stigma upon all who 
enter into same-sex marriages made lawful by the unquestioned 
authority of the States.5 
In this hallmark passage of the Kennedy Doctrine, Justice Kennedy 
treats the moral concerns of the majority as the equivalent of animus; 
in other words, he translates moral disagreement into the “bare desire 
to harm,” as Justice Scalia noticed: 
The sum of all the Court’s nonspecific hand-waving is that this 
law is invalid (maybe on equal-protection grounds, maybe on 
substantive-due process grounds, and perhaps with some 
amorphous federalism component playing a role) because it is 
motivated by a “‘bare . . . desire to harm’” couples in same-sex 
marriages.6 
 
5. Windsor, 133 S. Ct. at 2693 (alteration in original) (quoting Romer, 517 
U.S. at 633). What Justice Kennedy found unusual was not changing the 
basic definition of marriage to include same-sex couples, but codifying in 
federal law the understanding of marriage in place when every federal 
statute referencing marriage was enacted. Federal “intrusions” on state 
marriage laws are not new. Conditioning new states’ entrance to the union 
on forbidding polygamy is an example, see, e.g., Utah Enabling Act, ch. 
138, sec. 3, 28 STAT. 107, 108 (1894), and that provision was very 
similarly motivated and grounded in the idea that marriage was part of 
the basic social and moral order. See also Murphy v. Ramsey, 114 U.S. 
15, 45 (1885) (“[N]o legislation can be supposed more wholesome and 
necessary . . . than that which seeks to establish it on the basis of the idea 
of the family, as consisting in and springing from the union for life of one 
man and one woman in the holy estate of matrimony.”). 
6. Windsor, 133 S. Ct. at 2707 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (alteration in original) 
(quoting id. at 2693 (majority opinion)). 
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The Kennedy Doctrine thus conceptually defines animus upwards, and 
in a way, we argue, which intensifies rather than defuses the winner-
take-all aspect of the moral conflicts over gay marriage in American 
society. 
With the advent of the Kennedy Doctrine, the law’s failure to 
affirm all values equally (at least in any “unusual” law recently passed) 
becomes the equivalent of stigmatizing those values not actively 
affirmed by law.  
The Kennedy Doctrine collapses the negative and positive poles of 
moral community. The absence of equal affirmation is the presence of 
stigmatization. For the government to uphold that the family ideal is 
a mother and a father is the equivalent of the government stigmatizing 
gay people as bad parents.  
In this scheme, there is one moral value alone that becomes the 
trump card, the moral value that says we must affirm all life choices 
equally unless those choices involve direct measurable harm to others 
(although this classical liberal underpinning is more assumed than 
articulated).7 Indeed, in this conceptual universe the difference between 
a liberty interest and an equality interest almost collapses, since it 
suggests the right to define the mystery of one’s life must also mean 
the right not only to act on it equally with other citizens, but to have 
those life choices equally esteemed at least by law.8 
The difference between a desire to harm and a desire to affirm, 
between the wish to punish and the impulse to idealize, becomes 
invisible in this constitutional ideology. 
Let us here state what is probably obvious: gay people have 
experienced a great deal of animus in our society, and incivility, and 
open hatred, and sometimes violence. It is quite likely that some people 
who supported DOMA did so at least partly out of animus, classically 
understood. But, under the Kennedy Doctrine, the desire to protect a 
traditional moral understanding of marriage became in itself animus.9 
The effects of the law became the motivations of the lawmakers, by 
Justice Kennedy’s doctrinal redefinition. 
 
7. See infra notes 41–46 and accompanying text.  
8. Cf. Maggie Gallagher, Why Accommodate? Reflections on the Gay 
Marriage Culture Wars, 5 Nw. J.L. & Soc. Pol’y 260, 270–71 (2010) 
(defining a “liberty interest” as “the right to live as they choose, to express 
affection, to be who they are in public unmolested by harassment, to visit 
each other in hospital rooms, etc.” while an “equality interest” is a right 
“to be protected from knowledge of civil and moral disagreement with the 
choices one has made in everyday life, in the interests of advancing 
equality”). 
9. Windsor, 133 S. Ct. at 2693 (majority opinion). 
Case Western Reserve Law Review·Volume 64·Issue 3·2014 
Moral Disagreement and the “Bare Desire to Harm” 
952 
Justice Kennedy’s Lawrence v. Texas10 decision began with this 
description of the right involved: “Freedom extends beyond spatial 
bounds. Liberty presumes an autonomy of self that includes freedom of 
thought, belief, expression, and certain intimate conduct.”11 Later, 
Justice Kennedy wrote: “adults may choose to enter upon [a sexual] 
relationship in the confines of their homes and their own private lives 
and still retain their dignity as free persons.”12 The opinion said, 
referring to the defendants, that the sodomy law “demean[s] their 
existence.”13 He was speaking here, not just of the practical effects of 
criminality on the defendant’s lives and rights, but of a new concern 
for their moral feelings. And this concern did not, it turns out (as Scalia 
accurately predicted)14 rest upon the obvious stigmatizing effect of 
criminalizing gay sexual relations. 
In Windsor, Kennedy rests much of his case on the moral meaning 
of marriage, which he sees as conferred by the State. In Windsor, 
Justice Kennedy wrote: 
Here the State’s decision to give this class of persons the right to 
marry conferred upon them a dignity and status of immense 
import. When the State used its historic and essential authority 
to define the marital relation in this way, its role and its power 
in making the decision enhanced the recognition, dignity, and 
protection of the class in their own community. DOMA, because 
of its reach and extent, departs from this history and tradition of 
reliance on state law to define marriage. “[D]iscriminations of an 
unusual character especially suggest careful consideration to 
determine whether they are obnoxious to the constitutional 
provision.”15 
It is hard to see how to cabin in a principled way such a “human 
dignity” provision to the U.S. Constitution, especially if defining 
marriage as one man and one woman is viewed as “departing from” our 
“history and tradition.”16  
 
10. 539 U.S. 558 (2003). 
11. Id. at 562. 
12. Id. at 567. 
13. Id. at 578. 
14. Id. at 604 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (“Today’s opinion dismantles the 
structure of constitutional law that has permitted a distinction to be made 
between heterosexual and homosexual unions, insofar as formal 
recognition in marriage is concerned.”). 
15. United States v. Windsor, 133 S. Ct. 2675, 2692 (alteration in original) 
(quoting Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620, 633 (1996)). 
16. As noted by both dissenting opinions, Justice Kennedy was not saying 
that same-sex marriage was part of our “history and tradition.” See id. 
at 2706–07 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (noting that such a claim would be 
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DOMA’s definition of marriage was consistent with the definition 
of marriage in all fifty states when it was passed;17 it is the traditional 
and historic definition of marriage. Moreover, federal defenses of this 
definition of marriage, or intrusions into state family law, are not new. 
The federal government went to fairly extraordinary lengths to 
stamp out polygamy in the nineteenth century,18 to give just one 
example, and has conditioned federal money on states altering their 
family law to suit the federal government’s priorities,19 to give another. 
 Since virtually all laws with any kind of practical impact single out 
a minority for differential treatment in either giving or withholding of 
some benefit or penalty, it is hard to understand what recently passed 
law could not, if Justice Kennedy so preferred, provoke the under-
defined heightened constitutional scrutiny of the Kennedy Doctrine’s 
human dignity provisions. For example, is imposing tax penalties on 
the minority of people who choose not to buy health insurance 
departing from our history and tradition? And if so, by what standard 
do we judge whether or not such actual civil penalties detract from the 
human dignity of those mostly lower income Americans so singled out 
for unequal punishment?  
Justice Kennedy will know it when he sees it. 
But the Kennedy Doctrine so understood poses a challenge not only 
to clearly defined constitutional limits on the Court’s powers, but to 
the idea of pluralism in a democratic society. It is this latter feature of 
the Kennedy Doctrine and its impact on dissenters to the Court’s views 
on same-sex marriage that is our principal concern here.  
One of us is a lawyer, a legal participant who has watched the legal 
debate unfold, helping craft countless briefs both to state courts and to 
federal courts over the last fifteen years to make the case for the 
rationality and constitutionality of the traditional understanding of 
marriage. The other of us writes not as a legal scholar but as an acute 
observer and participant in this intellectual and political debate on the 
nature, meaning, and public purpose of marriage, as well as the status 
in the public square of those who adhere to classic understanding  
of marriage. 
 
“absurd”); id. at 2715 (Alito, J., dissenting) (cautioning against 
recognizing same-sex marriage as a new right).  
17. See H.R. REP. NO. 104-664, at 3 (1996) (“No State now or at any time 
in American history has permitted same-sex couples to enter into the 
institution of marriage.”). 
18. See supra note 5. 
19.  See, e.g., Henry D. Krause, Child Support Reassessed: Limits of Private 
Responsibility and the Public Interest, 24 Fam. L.Q. 1 (1990) (providing 
an overview of how Congress shaped child-support policies in the states). 
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Our goal in engaging in this public debate is “achieving 
disagreement”20 to make intelligible to the majority of elite and 
academic commentators the concerns of millions of Americans who hold 
the increasingly judicially-disfavored view that marriage is 
intrinsically—that is by its nature—a union of husband and wife.  
In this great task of doing the first work of democracy, 
understanding one another where we disagree on deeply held moral 
values, Justice Anthony Kennedy’s stigmatization of the views of 
millions of Americans as “animus”21 and the “bare desire to harm”22 is 
deeply counterproductive.  
The most disturbing part of the Kennedy decision is its cavalier 
dismissal—indeed, failure to take notice—of the concerns of millions of 
Americans for whom including same-gender couples in the definition of 
marriage requires surrendering a core understanding of what marriage 
is and what it is for.23 This understanding of marriage is not just a 
personally or religiously derived moral norm, but has been the clear 
understanding of the law about the public purposes of marriage  
for generations.24 
For example, New York’s highest court noted: “Until a few decades 
ago, it was an accepted truth for almost everyone who ever lived, in 
any society in which marriage existed, that there could be marriages 
only between participants of different sex.”25 In Henri de Bracton’s 
 
20. George Weigel, Achieving Disagreement: From Indifference to Pluralism, 
8 J.L. & Religion 175 (1990). 
21. Windsor, 133 S. Ct. at 2693 (majority opinion).  
22. Id. at 2696.  
23. See John Corvino & Maggie Gallagher, Debating Same-Sex 
Marriage (2012); SHERIF GIRGIS ET AL., WHAT IS MARRIAGE? MAN 
AND WOMAN: A DEFENSE 24–36 (2012) (defining the “Traditional View” 
of marriage as a “comprehensive” union comprising (a) unifying activities, 
(b) unifying goods, and (c) unifying commitments). For a shortened 
version of Sherif Girgis’s efforts, see Sherif Girgis, Windsor: Lochnerizing 
on Marriage?, 64 Case W. Res. L. Rev. 971, 1002–04 (2014). 
24. See Amici Curiae Brief of Scholars of History and Related Disciplines in 
Support of Petitioners at 3, Hollingsworth v. Perry, 133 S. Ct. 2652 
(No. 12-144) (“Before 2003, same-sex marriage had never existed in the 
United States and it is still comparatively rare. Indeed, before 2000 it had 
never existed in human history.”) [hereinafter Brief of Scholars of 
History]. 
25. Hernandez v. Robles, 855 N.E.2d 1, 8 (N.Y. 2006); see also Windsor, 133 
S. Ct. at 2689 (“It seems fair to conclude that, until recent years, many 
citizens had not even considered the possibility that two persons of the 
same sex might aspire to occupy the same status and dignity as that of a 
man and woman in lawful marriage. For marriage between a man and a 
woman no doubt had been thought of by most people as essential to the 
very definition of that term and to its role and function throughout the 
history of civilization.”). 
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thirteenth-century treatise—a treatise that functioned as the basis to 
case law for jurists that would follow, de Bracton included in the “law 
which men of all nations use . . . the union of man and woman, entered 
into by the mutual consent of both, which is called marriage,” and from 
marriage, de Bracton observed, “there also comes the procreation and 
raising of children.”26 
As John Bouvier explained in a legal encyclopedia from 1851, “[t]he 
end of marriage is the procreation of children and the propagation of 
the species.”27 Joel Prentiss Bishop, arguably the most prominent 
treatise author in the mid-nineteenth century United States, wrote that 
“[m]arriage between two persons of one sex could have no validity, as 
none of the ends of matrimony could be accomplished thereby.”28 
Not only voters, but many judges have found these reasons why 
marriage is intrinsically a male-female union perfectly intelligible.  
For example, from the New York Court of Appeals: 
Heterosexual intercourse has a natural tendency to lead to the 
birth of children; homosexual intercourse does not. Despite the 
advances of science, it remains true that the vast majority of 
children are born as a result of a sexual relationship between a 
man and a woman, and the Legislature could find that this will 
continue to be true. The Legislature could also find that such 
relationships are all too often casual or temporary. It could find 
that an important function of marriage is to create more stability 
and permanence in the relationships that cause children to be 
born. It thus could choose to offer an inducement—in the form of 
marriage and its attendant benefits—to opposite-sex couples who 
make a solemn, long-term commitment to each other.  
The Legislature could find that this rationale for marriage 
does not apply with comparable force to same-sex couples. These 
couples can become parents by adoption, or by artificial 
insemination or other technological marvels, but they do not 
become parents as a result of accident or impulse. The Legislature 
could find that unstable relationships between people of the 
opposite sex present a greater danger that children will be born 
into or grow up in unstable homes than is the case with same-sex 
couples, and thus that promoting stability in opposite-sex 
relationships will help children more. This is one reason why the 
 
26. HENRI DE BRACTON, 2 ON THE LAWS AND CUSTOMS OF ENGLAND 27 
(George E. Woodbine ed., Samuel E. Thorne, trans., Harvard Univ. Press 
1968); see also Brief of Scholars of History, supra note 24, at 17–18. 
27. JOHN BOUVIER, 1 INSTITUTES OF AMERICAN LAW No. 238, at 102 
(Philadelphia, Peterson 1851); see also Brief of Scholars of History, supra 
note 24, at 22. 
28. JOEL PRENTISS BISHOP, COMMENTARIES ON THE LAW OF MARRIAGE 
AND DIVORCE, AND EVIDENCE IN MATRIMONIAL SUITS § 225, at 175 (1st 
ed., Brown, Little, Brown 1852); see also Brief of Scholars of History, 
supra note 24, at 22. 
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Legislature could rationally offer the benefits of marriage to 
opposite-sex couples only. 
There is a second reason: The Legislature could rationally 
believe that it is better, other things being equal, for children to 
grow up with both a mother and a father. Intuition and 
experience suggest that a child benefits from having before his or 
her eyes, every day, living models of what both a man and a 
woman are like. It is obvious that there are exceptions to this 
general rule—some children who never know their fathers, or their 
mothers, do far better than some who grow up with parents of 
both sexes—but the Legislature could find that the general rule 
will usually hold.29 
The Eighth Circuit similarly ruled as follows:  
The State argues that the many laws defining marriage as 
the union of one man and one woman and extending a variety of 
benefits to married couples are rationally related to the 
government interest in “steering procreation into marriage.” By 
affording legal recognition and a basket of rights and benefits to 
married heterosexual couples, such laws “encourage procreation 
to take place within the socially recognized unit that is best 
situated for raising children.” The State and its supporting amici 
cite a host of judicial decisions and secondary authorities 
recognizing and upholding this rationale. The argument is based 
in part on the traditional notion that two committed 
heterosexuals are the optimal partnership for raising children, 
which modern-day homosexual parents understandably decry. 
But it is also based on a “responsible procreation” theory that 
justifies conferring the inducements of marital recognition and 
benefits on opposite-sex couples, who can otherwise produce 
children by accident, but not on same-sex couples, who cannot. 
Whatever our personal views regarding this political and 
sociological debate, we cannot conclude that the State’s 
justification “lacks a rational relationship to legitimate state 
interests.”30 
Similarly, the Maryland Court of Appeals addressed the issue in the 
following way: 
We agree that the State’s asserted interest in fostering 
procreation is a legitimate governmental interest. As one of the 
fundamental rights recognized by the Supreme Court as a matter 
of personal autonomy, procreation is considered one of the most 
 
29. Robles, 855 N.E.2d at 7. 
30. Citizens for Equal Prot. v. Bruning, 455 F.3d 859, 867–68 (first and 
second citations omitted) (8th Cir. 2006) (quoting Morrison v. Sadler, 821 
N.E.2d 15, 24–26 (Ind. Ct. App. 2005); Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620, 
632 (1996)). 
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important of the fundamental rights. In light of the fundamental 
nature of procreation, and the importance placed on it by the 
Supreme Court, safeguarding an environment most conducive to 
the stable propagation and continuance of the human race is a 
legitimate government interest.  
The question remains whether there exists a sufficient link 
between an interest in fostering a stable environment for 
procreation and the means at hand used to further that goal, i.e., 
an implicit restriction on those who wish to avail themselves of 
State-sanctioned marriage. We conclude that there does exist a 
sufficient link. As stated earlier in this opinion, marriage enjoys 
its fundamental status due, in large part, to its link to 
procreation. This “inextricable link” between marriage and 
procreation reasonably could support the definition of marriage 
as between a man and a woman only, because it is that 
relationship that is capable of producing biological offspring of 
both members (advances in reproductive technologies 
notwithstanding). Acceptance of this notion is found in the clear 
majority of opinions of the courts that have considered the issue.31 
Similar arguments for marriage presented to the Supreme Court that 
many other courts have been able to acknowledge, are not so much 
disputed by or refuted by Justice Kennedy as simply ignored.  
The Court was presented with these arguments by the Bipartisan 
Legal Advisory Group (BLAG), representing the interests of the United 
States House of Representatives. For instance, the authors of the BLAG 
brief on the merits wrote: 
Although much has changed over the years, the biological 
fact that opposite-sex relationships have a unique tendency to 
produce unplanned and unintended offspring has not. While 
medical advances, and the amendment of adoption laws through 
the democratic process, have made it possible for same-sex 
couples to raise children, substantial advance planning is 
required. Only opposite-sex relationships have the tendency to 
produce children without such advance planning (indeed, 
especially without advance planning). Thus, the traditional 
definition of marriage remains society’s rational response to this 
unique tendency of opposite-sex relationships. And in light of that 
understanding of marriage, it is perfectly rational not to define as 
marriage, or extend the benefits of marriage to, other 
relationships that, whatever their other similarities, simply do not 
have the same tendency to produce unplanned and potentially 
unwanted children. Indeed, Congress recognized as much. See 
House Rep. 14 (“Were it not for the possibility of begetting 
children inherent in heterosexual unions, society would have no 
 
31. Conaway v. Deane, 932 A.2d 571, 630 (Md. 2007) (citations omitted). 
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particular interest in encouraging citizens to come together in a 
committed relationship.”).32 
This point was also made by various prominent amici, including 
Professor Helen Alvaré, who argued the point in the following manner: 
The disappearing of children’s interests in marriage, both at 
law and in culture, and the vaulting of adults’ emotional and 
status interests, are, today, associated with a great deal of harm, 
particularly among the most vulnerable Americans. This, in turn, 
has led to a growing gap between the more and less privileged in 
the United States, threatening our social fabric. Recognizing 
same-sex marriage would confirm and exacerbate these trends. 
Consequently, states legitimately may wish to reconfirm their 
commitment to opposite-sex marriage on the grounds of its 
procreative aspects, and refuse to grant marriage recognition to 
same-sex couples.33 
But in the course of a fifteen-page majority opinion,34 Justice Kennedy 
responded to these arguments only in this way:  
The history of DOMA’s enactment and its own text 
demonstrate that interference with the equal dignity of same-sex 
marriages, a dignity conferred by the States in the exercise of 
their sovereign power, was more than an incidental effect of the 
federal statute. It was its essence. The House Report announced 
its conclusion that “it is both appropriate and necessary for 
Congress to do what it can to defend the institution of traditional 
heterosexual marriage. . . . H. R. 3396 is appropriately entitled 
the ‘Defense of Marriage Act.’ The effort to redefine ‘marriage’ to 
extend to homosexual couples is a truly radical proposal that 
would fundamentally alter the institution of marriage.” The 
House concluded that DOMA expresses “both moral disapproval 
of homosexuality, and a moral conviction that heterosexuality 
better comports with traditional (especially Judeo-Christian) 
morality.” The stated purpose of the law was to promote an 
“interest in protecting the traditional moral teachings reflected in 
heterosexual-only marriage laws.” Were there any doubt of this 
 
32. Brief on the Merits for Respondent the Bipartisan Legal Advisory Group 
of the U.S. House of Representatives at 45–46, United States v. Windsor, 
133 S. Ct. 2675 (2013) (No. 12-307) (quoting H.R. Rep. 104-664, at 14 
(1996)). 
33. Brief of Amicus Curiae Helen M. Alvaré in Support of Hollingsworth and 
Bipartisan Legal Advisory Group Addressing the Merits and Supporting 
Reversal at 23, Hollingsworth v. Perry, 133 S. Ct. 2652 (2013) (No. 12-
144); Windsor, 133 S. Ct. 2675 (No. 12-307). 
34. Windsor, 133 S. Ct. 2675.  
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far-reaching purpose, the title of the Act confirms it: The Defense 
of Marriage.35 
This is not a refutation or an argument, it is a moral dismissal, a 
pronouncement by the Court that caring about the traditional 
understanding of marriage is on its face evidence of moral turpitude. 
The law, its legislators, and those advocating for legislation are no 
longer required merely to view all people as equal; we are required to 
view people’s intimate relationships and sexual behavior as having 
equal dignity in order to escape the charge of animus. 
Justice Kennedy could believe this classic understanding of 
marriage is objectively wrong and so openly impose his own morally 
better understanding of marriage. He could rule the values underlying 
the classic understanding of marriage are outmoded, although that 
would seem to imply the updating process ought to be left to the People 
themselves. He could rule the government’s interest in creating families 
in which children are raised by mothers and fathers is less important 
than the human right of same-sex couples to have their relationships 
validated as equal.  
But for Justice Kennedy and the Court to fail to acknowledge that 
this classic understanding of marriage exists, apart from a history of 
dislike of gay people, is an intellectual and moral lacuna of the first 
order. It is to depart from reality, and to express profound contempt 
for the views of half of the American people. 
Animus and Pluralism 
In the name of “human dignity,” the Kennedy Doctrine thus 
collapses the distinction between liberty interests and equality interests, 
and between reason and sexual desire.36  
So the Kennedy Doctrine is an open invitation to subjective court 
interference. Human dignity is a concept so broad that predicting when 
it will trump a law is exceedingly difficult. 
Secondly, it involves a lack of reciprocity. Of all judicial values, 
fairness is surely one of the most basic. And the Kennedy Doctrine 
suggests (perhaps further litigation will disabuse us of the notion) the 
idea that the message of marriage demeans gay people but the demotion 
of supporters of the classic understanding of marriage into people 
motivated by animus sends no constitutionally significant message.37 
 
35. Id. at 2693 (quoting H.R. Rep. 104-664, at 12–13, 16 (1996)).  
36.  While no human beings, including gay human beings, can be reduced to 
their sexual desires, sexual orientation as a concept is defined by the 
object of one’s sexual passions, including romantic and affectionate ones, 
or it has no clear conceptual meaning. 
37. Manya A. Brachear, Church Agencies Probed on Gay Foster Parent Ban, 
Chi. Trib., Mar. 2, 2011, at 6; Manya A. Brachear, Rockford Charity 
Ends Foster Care, Chi. Trib., May 27, 2011, at 9; Joseph Erbentraut, 
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Put another way, the classic understanding of marriage sends a message 
to gay people, but the mandatory legal inclusion of gay people sends no 
message about marriage or faith that need concern adherents of the 
classic understanding of marriage.  
Third, it demeans as unintelligible the concerns of supporters of our 
marriage traditions. The Court’s refusal to provide a rationale for why 
the classic understanding of marriage has been constitutionally 
superseded by a new understanding of marriage, and Kennedy’s 
assertion instead that the classic understanding of marriage is rooted in 
animus aimed at undermining the human dignity of gay people, sends 
a powerful new “unusual” message of stigmatization to people who 
adhere to the traditional understanding of marriage. 
Accepting into our Constitution the Kennedy Doctrine’s core thesis 
that the idealization of unions of husband and wives constitutes 
irrational hatred of gay people will encourage a variety of harms to 
traditionalist marriage believers and to their mediating institutions in 
society.  
In just the past few years, we have seen a federally chartered 
university punish an employee for signing a petition putting same-sex 
marriage to a vote.38  
Other institutions and people will be encouraged if the Supreme 
Court embraces the Kennedy Doctrine’s views to punish and stigmatize 
moral disagreement with the new law. 
We saw 65,000 people put their name to a petition calling for the 
board of Mozilla to fire Brendan Eich if he did not recant his support 
for Proposition 8.39 Media reports suggest many workers are now afraid 
to make their views known, however civilly expressed.40  
What Counts as an Argument? Intelligibility and Moral Disagreement 
Liberalism as a cultural and moral system contains certain 
unexamined presumptions about what “counts” as a moral argument. 
 
Foster-Care Agencies that Deny Gay Parents Under Review, Windy 
City Times, Mar. 9, 2011, at 7. 
38. See Jenna Johnson, Gallaudet Official Angela McCaskill Says She Will 
Seek Compensation in Anti-Gay Marriage Petition Dispute, WASH. 
POST, Oct. 16, 2012, http://www.washingtonpost.com/blogs/campus-
overload/post/gallaudet-president-wants-angela-mccaskill-to-return-
following-gay-marriage-petition-controversy/2012/10/16/c068cda6-179e-
11e2-8792-cf5305eddf60_blog.html. 
39.  Emma Margolin, Mozilla Under Fire for New CEO’s Anti-Gay Past, 
MSNBC, Mar. 31, 2014, http://www.msnbc.com/msnbc/new-mozilla-
ceo-prop-8-backlash. 
40.  Warner Todd Huston, Witch Hunt of Mozilla CEO Brendan Eich Still 
Haunts Silicon Valley, BREITBART, June 15, 2014, http://www. 
breitbart.com/Big-Journalism/2014/06/13/Intolerance-For-Christian-
Views-Causing-Supporters-of-Mozilla-s-Eich-to-Stay-Mum. 
Case Western Reserve Law Review·Volume 64·Issue 3·2014 
Moral Disagreement and the “Bare Desire to Harm” 
961 
These are often stated in terms that suggest this legally privileged point 
of view is one of moral neutrality between competing moral views.41 
But the gay marriage debate reveals an intellectual and moral hole in 
the center of this presumption of neutrality. What Western liberals find 
“intelligible” as a rational moral argument is strikingly different from 
what the majority of humanity finds a reasoned argument.42 
Intelligible is not the same as “true.” We are not arguing that these 
alternative conceptions of what counts as a moral argument must be 
true, but we are disputing the claim, repeatedly elevated in the gay 
marriage debate that these arguments do not exist, that no rational 
person can hold them. Only people deeply indoctrinated in WEIRD 
moral presumptions, “Western Educated Industrial Rich and 
Democratic,”43 find the idea that marriage is the union of husband and 
wife unintelligible.  
Others may find it wrong—that is another matter—but the 
inability of Western liberals to perceive the arguments for marriage 
should be—we argue—taken as a sign of a failure of their moral and 
intellectual imaginations to comprehend diverse views (including views 
they disagree with) rather than as a scientific fact. 
We have a certain set of empirical foundations for this view. (Again 
it is not a view of what is true, but of what counts as an “intelligible 
argument” worthy of consideration, even if it is rejected.) 
Social psychologist Jonathan Haidt, who has written about the 
psychological foundations of morality, found that self-described liberals, 
especially those who called themselves “very liberal,” were worse at 
predicting the moral judgments of moderates and conservatives than 
moderates and conservatives were at predicting the moral judgments of  
41. See John Rawls, The Idea of Public Reason Revisited, 64 U. Chi. L. Rev. 
765, 795 (1997). 
42. Cf. Jonathan Haidt, The Moral Roots of Liberals and Conservatives, 
TED.com (Feb. 2008), http://www.ted.com/talks/jonathan_haidt_on
_the_moral_mind.html. For a more formal treatment of Professor 
Haidt’s research findings, see Jonathan Haidt, The Righteous Mind: 
Why Good People Are Divided by Politics and Religion (2012) 
[hereinafter Haidt, Righteous Mind]; Jonathan Haidt & Jesse Graham, 
When Morality Opposes Justice: Conservatives Have Moral Intuitions that 
Liberals May Not Recognize, 20 Soc. Just. Res. 98 (2007). The moral 
matrix for American liberals ranks Care, Liberty, and Fairness as the 
important foundations. Haidt, Righteous Mind, supra note 42, at 297 
fig.12.2. In contrast, American social conservatives value all six 
foundations (care/harm, liberty/oppression, fairness/cheating, 
loyalty/betrayal, authority/subversion, and sanctity/degradation) 
equally. Id. at 306 fig.12.4. 
43. Haidt, Righteous Mind, supra note 42, at 96–98; see Rob Moll, Views 
of the WEIRD (Western Educated Industrial Rich and 
Democratic), Christianity Today (July 19, 2012), http://www.christi
anitytoday.com/ct/2012/julyweb-only/views-of-the-weird.html 
(reviewing Haidt, Righteous Mind, supra note 42). 
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liberals. Liberals don’t understand conservative values. And they can’t 
recognize this failing, as the culturally empowered elites (intellectual 
and otherwise) necessarily invest less intellectual and moral resources 
in understanding alternative and minority views.44 
In the interests of “achieving disagreement,” we offer the following 
analysis of what millions of traditional-marriage supporters may care 
about (aside from animus) that the liberal worldview does not (unless 
stretched seriously to consider intellectual and moral diversity) count 
as a rational, i.e. “nonreligious” argument.45 
The concerns of millions of Americans, including Congress that 
passed DOMA, are literally invisible to Justice Kennedy. 
This is, in part, because marriage as a system does not easily fit 
into the liberal, including the classical liberal or libertarian, 
understanding of the state and morality, which is focused on 
individuals, their rights and their benefits.46 
Marriage in the views of traditional believers around the globe is 
not only and not primarily an individual right to access government 
benefits. It represents a moral ideal that is part of a system intended 
to achieve the difficult goal of influencing (in America, without 
coercions) the sexual behavior of adults. It is part of a sexual order that 
protects children and protects the ability of a good society to reproduce 
itself successfully by privileging certain kinds of relationships (not 
people) over others: lifelong, sexually faithful partnerships between men 
 
44. See Haidt & Graham, supra note 42, at 114 (“One psychological universal 
(part of the ingroup foundation) is that when you call someone evil you 
erect a protective moral wall between yourself and the other, and this 
wall prevents you from seeing or respecting the other’s point of view.”); 
William Saletan, Why Won’t They Listen?, N.Y. Times, Mar. 25, 2012, 
§ BR (Book Review), at 12, 13 (reviewing Haidt, Righteous Mind, 
supra note 42 ) (“[I]n a survey of 2,000 Americans, Haidt found that self-
described liberals, especially those who called themselves ‘very liberal,’ 
were worse at predicting the moral judgments of moderates and 
conservatives than moderates and conservatives were at predicting the 
moral judgments of liberals. Liberals don’t understand conservative 
values. And they can’t recognize this failing, because they’re so convinced 
of their rationality, open-mindedness and enlightenment.”). 
45. Maggie would like to report as an active participant in the gay marriage 
debate that she has had the repeated experience of making the public 
argument “marriage is grounded in the reality society has a special and 
distinct interest in bringing together male and female to make and raise 
the next generation, so that children have their mother and father” and 
being told “she has to make something other than a religious argument.” 
Maggie has a religion and is perfectly willing to make religious arguments, 
but the intellectual puzzle is how to explain how a rational argument with 
no religious referent is experienced by many people as a religious 
argument. 
46. See Haidt, Righteous Mind, supra note 42, at 146–54 (discussing the 
“Sanctity/Degradation Foundation”).  
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and women in which they precommit to not having sex or children 
outside this relationship, and in which they commit to raising any 
children they have together.  
A sexual order tends to hang together. It is always possible to 
debate which pieces of it can be dismantled without affecting the whole 
order, in pursuit of competing values. But that debate, if it is to be 
rational, must begin by recognizing what the order is, and what it is 
trying to accomplish.  
If one sees marriage as part of sexual order, rooted in the 
overwhelming reality of sex difference, family structure, and the need 
to create a next generation protected by mothers and fathers in one 
unitary family system, then the oft-repeated claim that elderly or 
infertile couples are similarly situated to same-sex couples becomes hard 
to take seriously intellectually. The inclusion of older couples in the 
pool of marrieds has been the condition of marriage from its inception, 
including all the many years in which judges, like ordinary people, 
understood marriage to be primarily about procreation.47 Surely it is 
not so hard to see that the inclusion of two men in the definition of 
marriage ruptures marriage from its historic roots, changes something 
that many (if not you) see as important to the nature of marriage?  
If one sees marriage as part of a (non-coercive) sexual order, which 
permits many other kinds of relationships, sexual and otherwise, but in 
which government and society attempt to idealize and support the one 
kind of relationship (husband and wife), which is important for children 
and for the community’s well-being, one could decide nonetheless to 
support gay marriage. Indeed, one could decide it is worthwhile to “take 
the risk” of changing one of the nearly universal pillars of marriage 
(rooted in sexual difference and the capacity to create new life) in 
pursuit of other goals. But one would be de-barred from the 
irrationality of Justice Kennedy in Windsor, the cavalier dismissal of 
competing concerns, or of the sweeping negative moral judgment 
pronounced on these concerns by five Justices of the Supreme Court. 
Systems or “orders” produce both meanings and values that are 
separate from the individuals’ motives and experiences. 
Sexual order is a particular problem, both because passion is hard 
to order, and because our ideas of individual liberty prevent us from 
accepting some older forms of sexual order. We hesitate above all else 
to stigmatize, which is to exclude from good citizenship and moral 
concern, people who violate sexual norms (apart from violence). 
In the context of constitutional law, the Court has made a sharp 
distinction between stigmatization and idealization when it comes to 
 
47. See Maggie Gallagher, (How) Will Gay Marriage Weaken Marriage as a 
Social Institution: A Reply to Andrew Koppelman, 2 U. St. Thomas L.J. 
33, 43–45 & nn.32–34 (2004) (citing various examples of authorities 
stating that marriage is for procreation). 
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abortion. The law can prefer childbearing to abortion, as long as it does 
not prevent individuals from accessing abortion if they prefer.48 
But in Windsor, Kennedy collapsed this distinction, arguing that 
any preference or idealization of one kind of family necessarily 
stigmatizes the alternatives: “The avowed purpose and practical effect 
of the law here in question are to impose a disadvantage, a separate 
status, and so a stigma upon all who enter into same-sex marriages 
made lawful by the unquestioned authority of the States.”49 
Our embrace of sexual liberty is heightened, of course, by 
technological changes that make the equation of sex and babies more 
problematic.  
For millions of educated and disciplined people, sex can be indulged 
in for a fairly-long period of time without producing children more than 
half the time.50 
We would argue that common elite experience should rationally be 
balanced against what we observe generally from the collapse of sexual 
norms and order. Without marriage as a serious moral ideal and norm 
regulating sexual behavior, sexual relationships of male and female 
regularly produce children. These children are either (a) killed in utero 
or (b) disproportionately raised in tumultuous families dominated by 
their parents’ aching romantic and erotic desires.51  
The single mothers who raise successful children do so largely by 
disciplining themselves sexually, erotically, and romantically in ways 
that married people can only admire and emulate: these successful 
single mothers prioritize their children over their own romantic and 
sexual drives.  
 
48. See Rust v. Sullivan, 500 U.S. 173, 193 (1991) (“The Government can, 
without violating the Constitution, selectively fund a program to 
encourage certain activities it believes to be in the public interest, without 
at the same time funding an alternative program which seeks to deal with 
the problem in another way.”). 
49. United States v. Windsor, 133 U.S. 2675, 2693 (2013). 
50. Half of all pregnancies in the United States remain unintended despite 
the legal right to contraceptives and their widespread availability. See 
Haishan Fu et al., Contraceptive Failure Rates: New Estimates from the 
1995 National Survey of Family Growth, 31 Fam. Plan. Persp. 56, 56 
(1999) (48%); Stanley K. Henshaw, Unintended Pregnancies in the United 
States, 30 Fam. Plan. Persp. 24, 28 tbl.3 (1998) (47.7%); see also James 
Trussell & Barbara Vaughn, Contraceptive Failure, Method-Related 
Discontinuation and Resumption of Use: Results from the 1995 National 
Survey of Family Growth, 31 Fam. Plan. Persp. 64, 71 (1999) (9% 
contraceptive failure). 
51. See Maggie Gallagher, Essay, Rites, Rights, and Social Institutions: Why 
and How Should the Law Support Marriage, 18 Notre Dame J.L. Ethics 
& Pub. Pol’y 225, 236–37 (2004) (discussing the signaling and 
channeling functions of marriage).  
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Or these single mothers are lucky enough to find new spouses who 
can overcome the problems of baby-mama dramas and disparate 
loyalties to build happy new stepfamilies.  
These successful non-intact families are common, but they are by 
no means the norm.52 And successful stepfamilies are most likely going 
to be formed by people who value and idealize marriage (and the 
personal sacrifices it requires, including forging relationships with 
stepchildren) as a norm and ideal which it is worth making  
sacrifices for. 
In the absence of a sexual system that idealizes and endorses 
marriage as a childrearing norm, the default condition are sexually less-
committed relationships that create children subjected to multiple and 
enduring baby-mama dramas and that do not produce the sense that 
mothers and fathers can be counted on to raise children together.53 
It is not necessary to have a religion to see this truth, although 
many who have experienced it personally (like Maggie, and like Phil 
Robertson, who turned from substance abuse, sex, drugs, and rock and 
roll, to fidelity, Jesus Christ, and paternity) have turned to religion as 
embodying the rational truth in a way that secularist theories  
often deny. 
The collapse of sexual order is doing immense harm to children and 
to women. The family is a system that by its nature constrains “self-
determination and individual autonomy.” To make the family fit into 
our preconceived liberal norms of choice and autonomy we have to do 
violence to its essential nature. A liberal critique of sexual liberalism 
includes the reality that the decline of a marriage culture creates huge 
gendered inequalities in opportunities, as women increasingly shoulder 
the burden of both supporting and nurturing children alone.54 
Some same-sex marriage advocates may seek to be part of a 
conservative sexual order,55 but getting to gay marriage requires 
overturning the first principle of our historic sexual order: that marriage 
 
52. See Pew Research Ctr., A Portrait of Stepfamilies, Pew Res. Soc. & 
Demographic Trends (Jan. 13, 2011), http://www.pewsocialtrends.or
g/2011/01/13/a-portrait-of-stepfamilies/ (reporting that step relatives 
are present in four-out-of-ten American households). 
53. See id. (finding that among adults with biological and step or half siblings, 
64% are very obligated to help a biological sibling but only 42% would 
feel the same obligation to step or half siblings). 
54. Susan Shell, The Future of the Liberal Family, in America at Risk: 
Threats to Liberal Self-Government in an Age of Uncertainty 
117, 131–34 (Robert Faulkner & Susan Shell eds., 2009). 
55. See, e.g., Jonathan Rauch, Gay Marriage: Why It is Good for 
Gays, Good for Straights, and Good for America 66–67 (2004) 
(arguing that same-sex marriage would “the greatest step toward 
maturity” for gay culture). 
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is the social ideal because it brings together mothers and fathers  
for children.  
Liberals, including most libertarians or classical liberals56 who are 
identified in modern ideological parlance as “conservatives,” have an 
extremely difficult time acknowledging a threat to the sexual order as 
a “harm” unless it is simultaneously a harm to every individual. In 
particular, they have an emotionally and intellectually difficult time 
countenancing any concrete harm to a particular individual in defense 
of an abstract sexual or social order. 
This is what the oft-repeated claim that there is no possible 
argument against gay marriage means.  
It begins with the creation of an abstract and unlikely analogy: 
redefining marriage to accommodate same-sex couples will have no 
more effect on marriage as an idea and ideal than allowing infertile 
opposite-sex couples to marry. If the latter can be a marriage, there is 
no reason to suppose two men in a marriage will make any difference. 
And it ends with intellectual blindness, with an inability to even 
see the ways in which gay marriage changes marriage for millions of 
American who hold the classic understanding. 
There is one great exception to this generalization that liberalism 
cannot tolerate a concrete harm to an individual in defense of a public 
moral “system” or “order.” When the moral ideal of “equality” is at 
stake, liberals are prepared to witness disproportionate and very 
concrete personal harms to individuals enforced by the law in defense 
of the abstract notions of equality. 
In the name of equality, whole swaths of professions are being closed 
to people who do not share in Justice Kennedy’s moral views. You 
cannot be a judge in the state of Washington, for example, if you 
privately state you are unwilling to perform gay marriages for religious 
reasons.57  
Let us put before you one such individual. Melissa Klein of 
Gresham, Oregon, who violated the moral order of “equality” by 
politely declining to bake a wedding cake for a lesbian couple.58 The 
 
56. There are some exceptions; for example, see Susan M. Shell, The Liberal 
Case Against Gay Marriage, 156 Pub. Int. 3 (2004) (critiquing the liberal 
view on marriage); Seana Sugrue, Soft Despotism and Same-Sex Marriage, 
in The Meaning of Marriage: Family, State, Market, and 
Morals 172, 172–196 (Robert P. George & Jean Bethke Elshtain eds., 
2006) (“Same-sex marriage undermines core civil institutions so as to 
better gratify consenting adults. . . . The cost of same-sex marriage, and 
the privacy rights upon which it is based, is soft despotism, not simply 
for oneself but also for one’s children.”).  
57. In re Tabor, CJC No. 7251-F-158, 2013 WL 5853965, at *2 (Wash. 
Comm’n on Judicial Conduct, Oct. 4, 2013). 
58. Chelsea Kopta, Sweet Cakes Owners Respond to Firestorm Over 
Wedding Cake Decision, KATU.com, http://www.katu.com/news/inves
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couple went to the state of Oregon with their discrimination complaint. 
In January of 2014, the Bureau of Labor Standards agreed their 
complaint was justified and found that Melissa violated the law.59 
In defense, Melissa’s husband, Aaron Klein, asserted: 
“Discrimination is really the wrong terminology for what took place[.] 
I didn’t want to be a part of her marriage, which I think is wrong.” 60 
The couple’s discrimination claim led to press stories, which led to 
hate mail, death threats, and even minor, but ominous vandalism. 
Once, the couple discovered the bakery van parked in the driveway 
in front of their home had been ransacked. Nothing was taken, not even 
cash. The couple lived in a rural home off-the-beaten track, so some 
spontaneous skullduggery by outraged passersby seemed unlikely. 
“Somebody came up into our driveway and rummaged through our 
truck and took stuff out,” Melissa told the press.61 “The really strange 
thing is, they didn’t steal anything, they just made a mess. It kind of 
was a little creepy.”62 
But some same-sex marriage folks were not content with sending 
threats directly, according to the Kleins; they also threatened anyone 
willing to buy their cakes, or vendors that even referred customers to 
their cakes, leading to a large loss of business. 
As Aaron Klein explained:  
There’s a lot of close-minded people out there that would like to 
pretend to be very tolerant and just want equal rights[.] But on 
the other hand, they’ve been very, very mean-spirited. They’ve 
been militant. The best way I can describe it is they’ve used mafia 
tactics against the business. Basically, if you do business with 
Sweet Cakes, we will shut you down.63 
 
tigators/Sweet-Cakes-responds-to--222094901.html (last updated Oct. 30, 
2013, 9:04 AM).  
59. Molly Young, Sweet Cakes by Melissa Violated Same-Sex Couple’s Civil 
Rights When it Refused to Make Wedding Cake, State Finds, 
Oregonian (Jan. 17, 2014), http://www.oregonlive.com/business/index
.ssf/2014/01/sweet_cakes_by_melissa_investigation_wraps_up_as_st
ate_finds_evidence_that_bakery_violated_civil_rights_for_refusing_
to_make_same-sex_wedding_cake.html.  
60. Kopta, supra note 58. 
61. Billy Hallowell, Baker Who Lost Shop After Refusing Gay Couple’s 
Wedding Cake Has Surprise Reaction to Ongoing Attacks: “My Eternal 
Home Is What Matters,” Blaze, (Sept. 5, 2013, 7:41 AM), 
http://www.theblaze.com/stories/2013/09/05/burn-in-hell-you-racist-
pigs-christian-baker-who-refused-to-make-lesbian-couples-wedding-cake-
details-creepy-alleged-break-in-ongoing-challenges/. 
62. Id.  
63. Kopta, supra note 58. 
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Is the point of this story to suggest that what Melissa and Aaron 
and their family has gone through is somehow worse than what LGBT 
people experienced for decades? No, we say, explicitly not that. 
The point we wish to make here is that the abstract legal doctrine 
generated by the real, not-abstract, and pressing need to combat 
powerful Jim Crow segregation are now being swung into action against 
the Melissa Kleins of the world, even though the cases are sharply 
different. 
Melissa is not seeking to rigorously repress, exclude, and hurt gay 
people. She will happily serve gay people delicious desserts in her shop. 
Melissa is merely trying to lead her own life, consistent with her own 
faith. She does not want to give false testimony by personally 
participating in a marriage her faith teaches her is contrary to 
God-given natural order. 
Let us agree at least to notice: the new liberal moral order is willing 
to tolerate an immense concrete harm to Melissa’s livelihood, and the 
livelihood of five children, in defense of an abstract moral order of 
equality. 
The lesbian couple, Rachel Cryer and Laurel Bowman, certainly 
experienced a kind of harm when they learned their local baker doesn’t 
believe in gay marriage. They learned their joy over their happy day is 
not shared by their bakers. Millions of Americans do not see same-sex 
unions as marriages. The Oregon Equality Act of 2007 permits the 
Bureau of Labor and Industries to sanction up to $50,000 in civil 
damages for housing discrimination violations,64 a sum that clearly is 
intolerable for a small, personal business to bear. Simply refusing service 
in a “place of public accommodation”65 could lead to significant 
 
64. See Or. Rev. Stat. § 659A.885 (2013) (providing for a penalties to be 
assessed by the Commissioner of the Bureau of Labor and Industries). 
The $50,000 penalty is assessed for an initial violation of either section 
659A.145 or 659A.421 of the Oregon Revised Statute as well as violations 
of federal housing law. Section 659A.421 forbids discrimination when 
selling, buying, or leasing real property. The Oregon Administrative Rules 
further provides remedies for housing discrimination, which may include 
“[c]ompensation for emotional distress and impaired dignity.” Or. 
Admin. R. 839-003-230(d) (2014). If a small-business owner knowingly 
practices prohibited conduct such as “refus|ing] to buy from, sell to or 
trade with any person because of . . . discrimination based upon 
the . . . sexual orientation . . . of the person,” Or. Rev. Stat. § 30.860(1) 
(2013), which harms that person’s “business or property,” the small-
business owner could stand to lose “threefold the damages sustained” 
along with reasonable attorney’s fees. Id. § 30.860(2).  
65.  A “place of public accommodation” includes “[a]ny place or service 
offering to the public accommodations, advantages, facilities or privileges 
whether into the nature of goods, services, lodgings, amusements, 
transportation or otherwise.” Or. Rev. Stat. § 659A.400(1)(a) (2013). 
Case Western Reserve Law Review·Volume 64·Issue 3·2014 
Moral Disagreement and the “Bare Desire to Harm” 
969 
judgments against small businesses,66 including a recent order that a 
bar owner pay over $400,000 to eleven transgendered persons whom he 
told to not return to his bar.67  
But truthfully, the lesbian couple could have easily gone to the 
bakery next door and gotten a wedding cake. Their right to live as they 
choose does not really require putting Melissa’s family’s livelihood  
at risk.  
But, consistent with the Kennedy Doctrine, the emotional 
discomfort of learning that people have seriously different moral point 
of view gets upgraded and translated into an assault on human dignity.  
The pathway from there to pluralism, or tolerance, or mutual 
respect in a democracy across deep moral divides, is very hard to see.  
 
 
66.  For “deny[ing] full and equal accommodations, advantages, facilities and 
privileges of any place of public accommodation,” id. § 659A.403(a), or 
for providing notice that service may be denied, id. § 659A.409, small 
business owners or their employees, id. § 659A.406, may face 
compensatory and punitive damages. Id. § 659A.885(7)(1). 
67.  Blachana, LLC, 32 BOLI Orders 220, 238–39, 256 (2013). 
